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Abstract
We show how vicious circles in countries’ credit histories arise in
a model where output persistence is coupled with asymmetric infor-
mation between borrowers and lenders about the nature of output
shocks. In such an environment, default creates a pessimistic outlook
about the borrower’s output path. This translates into higher debt-
to-expected-output ratios, pushing up interest rates and hence debt
servicing costs. By raising the cost of future repayments, this creates
“default traps”. We provide empirical support for the model by build-
ing a long and broad cross-country dataset spanning over a century.
This data is used to provide evidence on the existence of a history-
dependent “default premium” and to show that the effect of output
persistence on sovereign creditworthiness is significant and consistent
with the model’s predictions after controlling for other determinants
of sovereign risk.
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1 Introduction
A major stylized fact about the history of sovereign borrowing is the per-
vasiveness of serial default. Lindert and Morton (1989) find that countries
that defaulted over the 1820-1929 period were, on average, 69 percent more
likely to default in the 1930s, and that those that incurred arrears and con-
cessionary schedulings during 1940-79 were 70 percent more likely to default
in the 1980s – clearly suggestive of substantial persistence in creditworthiness
patterns. While these probability estimates are not conditioned on countries’
fundamentals, evidence provided in Rogoff, Reinhart, and Savastano (2003)
indicates that serial default is only loosely related to countries’ indebtedness
levels and other fundamentals. They show that serial defaulters have lower
credit ratings and face higher spreads at relatively low indebtedness levels
– a phenomenon they call debt intolerance. The experience of such debt-
intolerant countries – involving a vicious circle of borrowing, defaulting and
being penalized with higher interest rates – stands in sharp contrast with
that of countries that manage to undergo a virtuous circle of borrowing and
repayment with declining sovereign spreads.
An associated empirical regularity is that default rarely entails complete
exclusion from international capital markets but mainly a re-pricing of coun-
try risk (higher spreads), at least for some time. This regularity is at odds
with much of the theoretical literature: in early models (notably Eaton and
Gersovitz, 1981) it is the threat of permanent exclusion from capital mar-
kets which is crucial to sustain sovereign lending; later models allowed for
this exclusion to be temporary but with random re-entry rules which are
not price-dependent (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006; Arellano, 2006).1 In prac-
tice, default is often punished not through outright denial of credit or fixed
re-entry rules but a worsening of the terms on which the country can bor-
row again.2 Provided that borrowing needs are not too price elastic, the
1A notable exception is Eaton (1996), who constructs a model where an endogenous
bond re-pricing creates a deterrent mechanism. Earlier studies have also well acknowledged
the problems associated with the assumption of strict market exclusion, including that of
coordination problems among multiple lenders (Kletzer, 1984), and borrowers’ retained
ability to invest in risk-free international assets after default, which would render default-
free lending unsustainable without other penalties (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989).
2In fact, not only is permanent exclusion quite rare, but even temporary loss of market
access tends to be relatively short-lived: recent estimates using micro data on international
loans and bond issuance put it at 2.5 years for the post-1980 period (Gelos et al., 2004).
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sovereign will continue to tap the market – absolute exclusion representing
only the limiting case in which lenders’ enforcement technology is so weak
that country spreads may become prohibitively large for any borrowing to
take place.
This paper argues that two structural features that are typically found in
emerging markets help explain both stylized facts. These structural features
are that output shocks are not only typically large, thus producing high
cyclical variability about trend growth, but also highly persistent.
That output volatility is generally high among emerging markets is a well-
documented phenomenon (see, for instance, Kose et al., 2006). Recent work
has related such volatility to a number of long-lasting structural features.
These range from domestic institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2005), commod-
ity specialization (Blattman et al., 2007) to imperfections in international
capital markets that limit these countries’ ability to issue domestic-currency
denominated sovereign debt, thus rendering them more vulnerable to cur-
rency fluctuations (Eichengreen et al., 2003).
What has received less attention in the literature, however, is the fact
that output volatility is often coupled with considerable persistence of out-
put shocks. For a given dispersion of shocks (conditional output volatility),
higher persistence implies that associated output fluctuations will be larger.3
So the same unconditional output volatility may be generated by different
combinations of persistence and dispersion of shocks. Yet, as we show be-
low, it is important to disentangle the effects of these distinct parameters
on sovereign risk. On a broader analytical level, such a separation is impor-
tant as well because there are distinct macroeconomic mechanisms behind
shock persistence in emerging-market economies. These include the presence
of short-run supply-side inelasticities that make primary commodity price
While there is some debate about whether recalcitrant borrowers are consistently punished
with higher spreads (Eichengreen and Portes, 1986; Ozler, 1993), broader historical data
that we present in this paper indicates that bond yields typically do rise in the wake
default events and remain higher than average (albeit declining) for several years after
those events. This is also consistent with evidence provided in Flandreau and Zumer
(2004) on the behavior of spreads during the pre-WWI period.
3To see this, let yi,t = ρyi,t−1 + ωi,t where yi,t is output of country i in period t, ρ is
the persistent parameter and ω is an i.i.d shock. Then we have that the unconditional
output volatility is σyi,t =
σωi,t√
1−ρ2 .
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shocks long-lasting,4 the various frictions (political as well as economic) which
make fiscal policy more procyclical in these countries5, as well as financial
and institutional frictions that typically magnify the sensitivity of domestic
credit to loan collateral values and balance sheet mismatches; as the latter
can induce prolonged spirals of output contraction or expansion, including
painful episodes of debt deflation (see, e.g., Calvo, 1998; Mendoza, 2006),
they tend to exacerbate overall output persistence.
[Tables 1 and 2 here]
This begs the question as to whether, and to which extent, output has in-
deed been typically more volatile and persistent among defaulters and serial
defaulters. Tables 1 and 2 provide suggestive evidence. Using data spanning
the century-and-quarter period from dawn of international bond financing
in the 1870s through 2004, the tables report the standard deviation as well
as the first autoregressive coefficient of HP-filter de-trended output for each
country over the three main sub-periods delimited by the World Wars. As
is immediately apparent from group medians, defaulting countries typically
display higher volatility and persistence than non-defaulting countries on av-
erage. Further, these cross-country differences appear to be typically even
higher between serial defaulters and non-defaulters, and are consistently ob-
served for certain countries over the entire 1870-2004 period. The postulated
relationship also appears to be robust to potential reverse causality emanat-
ing from the effects of defaults on the volatility and persistence of output
4See Cashin et al. (2000) and references therein for empirical evidence on the persis-
tence of commodity price shocks. Mendoza (1995) finds that terms of trade variations
typically account for up to one-half of business cycle fluctuations in developing countries.
5In a recession, a contractionary fiscal stance tends to delay recovery, which exacer-
bates shock persistence. Gavin and Perrotti (1997) and Kaminsky et al. (2004) provide
empirical evidence. Talvi and Vegh (2005) examine the role of political frictions in creating
such procylicality. Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2005) explain greater fiscal pro-
cyclicality in developing countries in terms of the incompleteness of international financial
markets. As this incompleteness limits long-term external borrowing in these countries’
own currency, when bad shocks hit (which typically entail a currency depreciation or de-
valuation), the cost of public borrowing rise accordingly; this in turn forces these countries
to undergo contractionary fiscal adjustment or at least limits the scope for counter-cyclical
fiscal policies. Guidotti et al. (2005) provide empirical evidence consistent with this theo-
retical story, in that more “dollarized” countries tend to display slower recoveries following
capital account shocks (“sudden stops”).
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shocks: when we eliminate from the sample all default events and their im-
mediate aftermaths, defaulters continue to display greater output volatility
and shock persistence relative to their more virtuous peers.
Against this background, the aim of this paper is twofold. The first is to
lay out a model that shows how, in the presence of informational asymme-
try, the combined effects of volatility and persistence of output shocks can
generate some path dependence in countries’ credit history. In particular,
when borrowers are better informed than lenders about the persistence of
their output shocks, repayment choice – default vs. repayment – can trig-
ger a discrete shift in expectations about the borrower’s future output path:
upon observing default, lenders might end up “assuming the worst” about
the repayment prospects on future loans. If so, fresh lending is likely to be at
significant higher interest rates. In contrast, repayment of past loans creates
a more favorable outlook for future repayment and justifies future lending at
lower interest rates. The difference between interest rates that the sovereign
borrower faces after default relative to those following repayment can be
viewed as a default premium. Ex-ante such a default premium constitutes
a deterrent mechanism that induces countries to pay even in the absence of
output penalties featuring elsewhere (e.g., Sachs and Cohen, 1985; Obstfeld
and Rogoff, 1996; Alfaro and Kanczuk, 2005). Ex-post, such a default pre-
mium raises the cost of future repayments beyond what is justified by other
fundamentals (including past history of output volatility and persistence),
and thus exacerbates the likelihood of future defaults. We use the notion of
default traps to capture the idea that, in the presence of fragile expectations,
the impact of a negative output shock on country risk can be amplified and
throw an otherwise solvent country on the path of serial default. More pre-
cisely, a country can fall into a default trap in that, once it defaults, it is
more likely to default again in the future, compared to another country with
identical fundamentals.
The second contribution of the paper is to provide empirical evidence for
the model’s results. Since the underlying volatility and persistence of output
tend to be slowly-evolving structural features that can vary widely from coun-
try to country, having a cross-sectionally broad and time-wise long country
panel is an important requirement to test the model’s main propositions. To
this end, we construct a uniquely long and broad cross-country panel span-
ning the first globalization era in the 1870s – when international financial
integration and sovereign bond financing began to climb to unprecedented
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historical levels – to 2004. This database is not only longer than previous
historical studies on sovereign risk (e.g. Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003) but also
has better output data for some countries and encompasses a wider set of
variables (See Appendix 2). Our results clearly indicate that countries with
more volatile and persistent output shocks are likely to face higher ex-ante
interest spreads and thus more likely to be caught into default traps. Con-
sistent with our theoretical results, we also find evidence of a significantly
positive default premium and of such a premium being rising with the un-
derlying persistence of deviations between actual and expected output - the
so-called output gap. This offers one explanation for why country spreads
(measured relative to the risk-free interest rate) react strongly to default an-
nouncements even after controlling for changes in other fundamentals. Such
a significant and typically long-lasting rise in spreads in turn makes countries
more likely to fall prey to default traps.
Our findings relate to those of previous studies. Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006) find that greater output persistence tends to raise sovereign default
risk. Their model does not rely on asymmetry of information between bor-
rowers and lenders and default is penalized by exclusion, with exogenous
market re-entry probabilities after default, rather than alter price of borrow-
ing. Whilst their analysis does not focus on serial default, it does follow
from it that countries with typically higher persistence of output shocks are
more prone to serial default. Other studies have examined the role of volatil-
ity in default risk also under symmetric information (e.g., Arellano, 2006;
Cata˜o and Kapur, 2006), showing that higher output volatility also tends
to raise sovereign spreads. As long as high output volatility remains an en-
demic structural feature of a given country or group of countries, this class
of models can also help rationalize serial default. Yet, neither paper can ex-
plain why a country with similar fundamentals as others is prone to fall into
a default trap once it has defaulted once; nor can any of the studies cited
above explain the existence of an empirically observable default premium
and the attendant fact that sovereign spreads typically shoot up following
default announcements (even after controlling for other fundamentals includ-
ing past output history), declining only gradually afterwards with subsequent
repayments. Allowing for the presence of information asymmetries between
borrowers and lenders on the nature of the output shock buys us precisely
the capacity to explain these two phenomena in a way that is consistent with
the broad historical evidence, as we show below.
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Other papers have explored the implications of informational asymme-
tries in models of sovereign debt.6 Typically, in these papers, observed de-
fault provides a signal about some unobservable borrower characteristic that
is relevant to the lender’s payoff. For instance, if borrowers differ unobserv-
ably in their discount rates, default may reveal the borrower to be relatively
short-termist. However, these models do not fully develop the implications of
these signals on price of future debt, so effectively overlook the default pre-
mium mechanism outlined in this paper. Eaton (1996) is notable exception:
he develops a model in which sovereign borrowers differ in the vulnerability
to the enforcement technology, rendering one less likely to default than the
other, and this does affect the price of future debt. However, to the extent
that the asymmetry of information in our paper relates to the borrower’s out-
put process, it allows us to examine directly the effects of output persistence
on country risk, allowing us to discuss the possibility of default traps.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the model, our
main theoretical results and discusses their robustness. Section 3 reports the
econometric results. The paper concludes with a summary of the main find-
ings and a brief discussion of the policy implications in Section 4. Appendix
1 presents proofs of the theoretical propositions while Appendix 2 describes
the data.
2 Model
2.1 The Sovereign Borrower
A sovereign borrower issues bonds in international capital markets to finance
investment in one-period projects. We develop our model in a simple setting
that involves three periods, t = 0, 1, and 2. The sovereign invests in periods
0 and 1. Investment It at t = 0, 1 returns expected output Y¯t = f(It) in
period t + 1, where f is concave. The country’s actual output is stochastic
due to two sources of output uncertainty: a persistent shock and a transient
shock. Specifically, output at t = 1, 2 is given by:
Y˜1 = f(I0) + ˜1 + ω˜1 (1)
6See, for instance, Kletzer (1984), Atkeson (1991), Calvo and Mendoza (2000), Alfaro
and Kanczuk (2005), Fostel (2005), Sandleris (2006), and D’Erasmo (2007).
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Y˜2 = f(I1) + ρ˜1 + ω˜2 (2)
Here random variable 1 is a persistent shock, with mean 0 and standard
deviation σ. Let Φ() denote the distribution of persistent shocks and φ()
the associated density function. The parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1) measures the
persistence of the shock from period 1 to period 2. Random variables ωt
denote transient shocks: these are independent with mean 0 and standard
deviation σω.
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For tractability we begin by assuming that investment levels I0 and I1
are exogenously given. This allows us to focus on the central concern in our
model: the sovereign borrower’s repayment decisions in periods 1 and 2, for
bonds issued in the previous periods. As the assumption may seem strong,
we later provide theoretical justification for it and examine the implications
of relaxing it.
The sovereign’s utility function is linear in payoffs. When making its
period-1 repayment choice, the sovereign maximizes E(y˜1 + βy˜2), where y˜t
denote its output net of any repayments and β ≤ 1 is a discount factor. With
this linear specification, the sovereign cares only about expected future payoff
associated with its current choices, an assumption that makes the analysis
tractable.
Investment is entirely financed by borrowing. To fund its investment
requirement It at t, the sovereign must issue one-period bonds of face value
Dt+1, where
ptDt+1 = It, (3)
and pt denotes the issue price of bonds.
2.2 Bond Markets and Sovereign Spreads
The bond market is competitive, with risk-neutral lenders who are willing to
subscribe to bonds at a price that allows them to break-even. The issue price
of bonds, determined endogenously in the model, depends on the perceived
likelihood of default. We assume that in the event of default, bondholders
7The shock variances are such that Y¯t < ˜t + ω˜t is a negligible probability event, so
that there is no ‘involuntary default’ caused by non-positive or extremely low output
realizations. This is consistent with empirical evidence that overwhelming majority of
defaults occur in countries with (positive) debt-to-GDP ratios below 100% and often at
moderate levels of indebtedness (Reinhart et al., 2003; D’Erasmo, 2007).
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can enforce partial recovery obtaining a proportion c < 1 of the face value
of outstanding debt. If the sovereign is expected to default at t + 1 with
probability pit+1, the expected return to a bond of unit face value is pit+1c+
(1−pit+1). A risk-neutral lender who acquires a unit bond at price pt at time
t expects to break even in period t+ 1 if
[pit+1c+ (1− pit+1)] = ptRf , (4)
where Rf = 1+ rf is the exogenously-given gross risk-free interest rate. The
competitive market-clearing price of bonds is
pt =
1− pit+1(1− c)
Rf
. (5)
As pt ∈ [c/Rf , 1/Rf ], the bond price is positive as long as c > 0. The price
of bonds pt(pit+1) is decreasing in the anticipated probability of default.
8
Bond yields, as conventionally defined,
it =
Rf
1− pit+1(1− c) − 1 (6)
are increasing in the probability of default, as is the sovereign spread over
the risk-free rate of interest, which equals (it − rf ).
2.3 Asymmetric Information and Default Premium
We assume that while Y¯t, ρ, and the distribution of shocks are common knowl-
edge, only the sovereign borrower observes the magnitude of its period-1
shocks directly. Bondholders do not, but make an inference about its likely
realization by observing the sovereign’s repayment decision in period 1. The
updated beliefs are used to form expectations of future output, and hence
the probability of future default.
In order to show how this information structure gives rise to the existence
of a default premium, we provide an informal discussion of the sequence of
8Eaton and Gersovitz (1995) provide an interesting argument as to why the probability
of default is unlikely to be greater than half for any credible debt contract. Also see Rose
and Spiegel (2004) for a similar assumption. We adopt this assumption for analytical
convenience. A restriction on default probabilities is also consistent with our empirical
approach where, like many others (e.g. Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003), we eliminate data
points that have spreads over 1000 basis points.
8
events and equilibrium before we state our formal result in the next sub-
section. At time t = 0, the sovereign issues one-period bonds with face value
D1 to meet its initial investment requirement I0, so that p0D1 = I0. The issue
price p0 of these bonds is determined endogenously, based on expected default
risk. At time t = 1, the sovereign observes its output shock and chooses
between default, d, or repayment, r. The period-1 repayment “history” is
denoted by h ∈ {d, r}.
On observing the sovereign’s repayment history in period 1 bondholders
update their beliefs in accordance with Bayes’ rule. The repayment decision
affects bondholders’ beliefs about the sovereign’s future output and, hence,
the probability of future default denoted as pih2 , varies with history h. The
sovereign then issues new bonds at t = 1, at price ph1 ≡ p1(pih2) to finance its
period-1 investment requirement I1. It requires
ph1D
h
2 = I1. (7)
Given the fixed investment requirement I1, if the issue price depends on h,
so does the required nominal bond issue, Dh2 .
Finally, at t = 2 the sovereign chooses whether or not to repay its debt
obligationDh2 . Given our choice of a finite-horizon framework, partial capture
provides insufficient deterrence against default in the final period. In the
absence of other penalties, at t = 2 the sovereign will default with probability
one. To avoid the trivialities associated with this case, we assume that default
in the final period is also punished with sanctions that cause the sovereign
to lose a fraction s of its current output Y˜2.
9 Figure 1 depicts the sequence
of events.
[Figure 1 here]
Our analysis begins, as is standard, from the final period. Given the
enforcement technology, repayment will be rational in the final period if
and only if the cost of sanctions exceeds any direct gain from reneging on
9As in Sachs and Cohen (1985) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) we assume that bond-
holders do not appropriate any benefit from these sanctions. Alternatively we might
interpret these as endogenous loss of output due to disruptions following default, as in
Cohen (1992), Calvo (2000).
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repayments. We show that the borrower repays at t = 2 if and only if the
debt-to-output ratio exceeds a critical threshold.
The borrower’s repayment choice in period 1 depends on a comparison
of the benefit and cost of default. Default has benefits in terms of repay-
ments avoided (except some which is captured). Default is costly because
to the extent it alters market perceptions of future default risk, the cost of
financing fresh investment rises. Given this trade-off, we show formally that
the optimal repayment rule in period 1 also satisfies a threshold property:
the borrower will repay in at t = 1 if and only if the realization 1 of the
persistent shock is above some threshold, e1. The equilibrium value of this
threshold will be denoted as e∗1.
The informational asymmetry between the borrower and bondholders
translates into differences in beliefs about the sovereign’s second-period out-
put. The sovereign, who observes the realization of the persistent shock 1,
expects Y˜2 to be distributed with mean f(I1) + ρ1 and standard deviation
σω. Let the associated (cumulative) distribution function be F|1(Y˜2). Bond-
holders, on the other hand, do not observe 1 but only the repayment history
h. Let Gh(Y˜2|e1) denote the lenders’ distribution over Y˜2 if they observe his-
tory h and if they believe the borrower’s repayment threshold to be e1. The
distributions F|1 and Gh summarize the information asymmetry. Together
{e1,Φ, F|1 , Gh} denote the evolution of beliefs over time.
In this setting, default in period 1 signals the realization of an adverse
output shock and, given persistence, creates a pessimistic outlook regarding
the sovereign’s future output and default risk. On the other hand, repayment
generates a more favorable outlook. This translates into higher conditional
probability of future default: that is, we have pid2 > pi
r
2. Using equation (5),
this implies that pr1 (the issue price of new bonds contingent on repayment at
t = 1) exceeds pd1 (the corresponding value contingent on default). Expressing
the same idea in term of bond yields, a country with a history of default is
required to offer higher bond yields id1 to attract funds than it would have
had to pay with a sound repayment history, ir1.
We refer to the difference id1 − ir1 (or equivalently, the difference in prices
pr1 − pd1) as the default premium. Note that this default premium is purely
a consequence of asymmetric information: if lenders could observe the real-
ization of output shocks, there would be no informational content in the act
of default per se, so that the default premium would vanish. The existence
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of a positive default premium is a key feature of our model. This feature is
formally shown in the equilibrium described below.
2.4 Default Traps Equilibrium
We model the interaction between the borrower and lenders as a game. For
descriptive purposes, it is convenient to consider the mass of lenders as a
single player: this ‘lender’ sets the bond price so that the expected return
on bonds equals the opportunity cost of capital. Thus the lender’s strategy
is given by prices (p0, p
r
1, p
d
1) that allow it to break even, given the perceived
likelihood of default (pi1, pi
r
2, pi
d
2).
A strategy for the sovereign borrower involves the following elements:
bond issuance D1 at t = 0, repayment choice h ∈ {r, d} followed by history-
contingent bond issuance Dh2 at t = 1, and, finally, the repayment choice at
t = 2.
Beliefs in the game are specified by the critical threshold e1 which deter-
mines the the borrower’s repayment choice in period 1, the prior distribution
Φ of persistent shocks, and the posterior distributions F|1 and Gh over the
final period output.
We consider a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of this game, at
which players choose strategies that are optimal given their beliefs and other
player’s strategies, and beliefs are consistent with strategies and observed
actions. Proposition 1 describes such an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exists an e∗1 such that the following is a PBE of the
game:
1. The borrower’s repayment decision at t = 1 is given by
h(1) =
{
r if 1 ≥ e∗1
d if 1 < e
∗
1
The borrower repays at t = 2 if and only if Y˜2 ≥ [(1− c)/s]Dh2 .
2. The lender’s strategy is given by (p0, p
r
1, p
d
1) at which it breaks even each
period given its beliefs. Moreover, pr1 − pd1 > 0: that is, the equilibrium
default premium is positive.
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3. The lender’s beliefs in period 0 are given by the prior distribution Φ(1).
At t = 1, if it observes default, beliefs are given by the density function
γd(1|e∗1) =
{
φ(1)
Φ(e∗1)
if 1 < e
∗
1
0 otherwise
If, instead, the lender observes repayment
γr(1|e∗1) =
{
φ(1)
1−Φ(e∗1) if 1 ≥ e
∗
1
0 otherwise.
The proof of this Proposition is provided in Appendix 1, but we high-
light two key features of the equilibrium. First, the equilibrium suggests the
possibility of what we refer to as default traps. Second, the positive default
premium constitutes an endogenous deterrence mechanism that can support
repayment of debt even in the absence of other penalties.
Given the information asymmetry, the borrower’s period-1 choice – de-
fault vs. repayment – can be quite informative. Default triggers a discrete
shift in expectations as the lender infers that the realization of the persistent
shock 1 must lie below the critical e
∗
1, that is, in the lower tail of distribution
Φ. In effect, the lender ‘assumes the worst’ about the future output path of a
borrower who defaults. Such pessimism, combined with the lender’s need to
break-even, implies that fresh borrowing is sustainable only at significantly
higher spreads, or equivalently, lower bond prices. If, as in our model, the
investment requirement is relatively inelastic, the required volume of issued
debt needs to be even higher to compensate for low issue prices. This, in
turn, raises the risk of future default. In contrast, a good credit history cre-
ates a more favorable outlook, with higher bond prices, lower nominal debt
requirements and significantly lower risk of future default.
Notice first that, once the impact of default on expectations is factored in,
the default premium can be quite large, which constitutes a deterrence mech-
anism that induces countries to repay even in the absence of other penalties.
Second, such a default premium raises the cost of future repayments be-
yond what is justified by other fundamentals (including past history of output
volatility and persistence), and thus exacerbates the likelihood of future de-
faults. We use the notion of default traps to capture the idea that, in the
presence of fragile expectations, the impact of a negative output shock on
12
country risk can be amplified and throw an otherwise solvent country on the
path of serial default. More precisely, a country can fall into a default trap in
that, once it defaults, it is more likely to default again in the future, compared
to another country with identical fundamentals. The underlying mechanism
is entirely symmetric, with a good repayment history creating a virtuous cy-
cle of lower spreads, smaller borrowing requirements and significantly lower
risk of default.
2.5 Comparative Statics
The deterrence mechanism allows us to explore how the equilibrium varies
with the degree of persistence. To appreciate this mechanism, note that
beliefs must be such that the borrower is just indifferent between default
and repayment at the threshold e∗1. The gain from repayment comes from
the more favorable terms of access to future borrowing. Let V r2 denote the
continuation payoff for the borrower following repayment and V d2 be the con-
tinuation payoff following default. These continuation values depend on 1
(as it conditions the borrower’s beliefs F|1 about future output), and on
expectations e1 regarding the repayment threshold (as that conditions the
lender’s posterior beliefs). The difference V r2 − V d2 captures the anticipated
future gain from repayment relative to default. The direct cost of repayment
is given by (1− c)D1. Given the prior distribution Φ(1), the ex-ante likeli-
hood of default at t = 1 equals Φ(e1). Recall that for risk-neutral lenders to
break even we must have
[1− (1− c)Φ(e1)]D1 = RfI0. (8)
Figure 2 captures the trade-off between the cost and benefit of repayment.
The upward-sloping curve represents the direct cost of repayment, CR(e1) ≡
(1 − c)D1(e1), as function of e1. As the solution D1(e1) to (8) is increasing
in e1, so is CR(e1). The downward-sloping curve represents the discounted
value of the future benefit from repayment, BR(e1) ≡ β[V r2 −V d2 ]. The proof
of Proposition 1 shows that BR(e1) is decreasing in the repayment threshold
e1.
10 At the equilibrium, the value of e1 must be such that BR(e
∗
1) = CR(e
∗
1).
10The proof also shows that BR is increasing in the realization of the shock 1, so that
the borrower is more likely to repay when output is high. This is not inconsistent with the
feature that the gain from repayment is decreasing in the repayment threshold e1, which
is in effect a strategy in the game.
13
[Figure 2 here]
Both benefit and costs vary with the other parameters of the model, so
variations in these will affect the equilibrium. Proposition 2 examines the
impact of changes in the persistence parameter ρ.
Proposition 2 An increase in the persistence parameter ρ raises the equi-
librium default premium and the ex-ante probability of default in period 1.
Once again, Appendix 1 provides a formal proof but the intuition is sim-
ple. Greater persistence implies that future output shocks are more closely
related to period 1 shock 1, so that the informational value of observed de-
fault is greater. The future gain from repayment relative to default would
be larger for any given repayment threshold e1, or in term of our graphical
representation, the downward sloping curve must be higher everywhere for a
larger persistence parameter. At e∗1, the gain from repayment now exceeds
the gain from default. To restore the balance between the gain from repay-
ment and default, equilibrium beliefs regarding the threshold needs to adjust
to a new, higher value (call it e∗∗1 ). This implies a higher ex-ante probability
of default and, by the break-even condition, higher sovereign spread at t = 0.
To put it differently, the strength of the deterrence mechanism determines
the riskiness of the loans that can be made. Stronger deterrence can support
debt contracts with larger nominal value, which in our setting tend to be
associated with greater probability of default.
Clearly, for persistence to play such a role in exacerbating the default trap
mechanism, volatility of output shocks must be relatively large. As discussed
in Section 1, what makes many emerging markets more prone to default traps
is not just high output gap persistence (a feature shared by many advanced
countries and non-serial defaulters) but the combined effects of persistence
with high conditional variance of output shocks. Such amplifying effects
of volatility on default risk have been documented elsewhere (Aguiar and
Gopinath, 2006; Arellano, 2006; and Cata˜o and Kapur, 2006) even in the
absence of asymmetric information. The logic of these results carry over
to our setting. To see this, consider the lender’s break-even condition as
in equation (8). Given that the repayment function is a step-function (the
borrower pays D1 if 1 ≥ e∗1 and cD1 otherwise), higher dispersion of 1
depresses the expected return to the lender. If so, the break-even condition
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requires the issue price of bonds to go down or, equivalently, the country
spread (it − rf ) to widen.
A similar result holds for bonds issued in period 1. The probability of
default in period 2 is given by pih2(D
h
2 ) = Gh((
1−c
s
)Dh2 ), which is increasing
in the volatility of distribution Gh. For the lender to break, the bond is-
sue Dh2 must satisfy [1 − (1 − c)pih2(Dh2 )]Dh2 = RfI1. Higher volatility then
is associated with higher probability of default and lower bond prices. The
only potentially attenuating effect of higher volatility on default risk in our
information asymmetry setting is that the precision of borrower’s signal (de-
fault vs. repayment) is lower when the volatility of output shocks is high.
The extent to which such a potentially attenuating mechanism interacts with
credit history to affect the first-order positive effect of output volatility on
spreads is ultimately an empirical matter which we examine in Section 3.
2.6 Discussion
Endogenous Investment and Default Costs
While period-2 output is vulnerable to exogenous shocks in our model, it
overlooks the possibility that default may cause endogenous loss of output.
Our model circumvents this possibility by assuming investment levels I0 and
I1 to be exogenously given. The crucial restriction is the assumption that
investment levels are invariant to repayment history h, or equivalently that
Ir1 = I
d
1 .
Our assumption may have proximate theoretical justification. Consider
the borrower’s choice of investment level in period 1 (an analogous argument
applies to period 0). The net expected return to real investment I1 is
f(I1)−D2[1− pi2(1− c)]. (9)
The above expression incorporates the borrower’s belief that in the event
of default it shall end up repaying only cD2 rather than its nominal debt
obligation D2. Using equations (5) and (3) this can be written as
11
f(It)−RfIt, (10)
11Alternatively, it can be written as f(p1D2)−D2p1Rf . This suggests that, for instance,
lower bond prices raise the cost of capital but allowing for default also lowers the expected
cost of servicing the debt. The latter effect reflects the standard moral hazard associated
with use of borrowed funds.
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with first-order condition for an interior maximum
f ′(I∗1 )−Rf = 0. (11)
Thus the optimally-chosen investment path I∗t depends only on the risk-free
rate. Crucially, the argument suggests that investment is independent of the
history-dependent bond prices, or that Id1 = I
r
1 . This serves as justification
for our working assumption.
Nonetheless empirical evidence suggests that default does tends to affect
investment and output. This could be due to factors that are not captured
in our model. A typical channel through which this could occur is a drop
in investment due to the increase in borrowing costs triggered by default.12
Following capital, disruptions to trade and access to working capital may
lower the productivity of capital, which would reinforce the adverse effect of
higher borrowing costs. Mendoza and Yue (2007) point out that following
default, the cost of financing imported inputs rises with the country spread,
inducing firms to shift to lower-cost domestic inputs that are less productive,
causing output to fall. In terms of our model, Y˜ d2 < Y˜
r
2 . Indeed, avoiding
such disruption reinforces the case for repayment, reinforcing the deterrence
mechanism in our model. On the other hand, the impact of default-induced
increases in spreads on the investment funding requirement depends, on the
price elasticity of investment. Even when Id1 < I
r
1 , as long as investment is
not too price elastic (this is especially the case when investment is necessary
for critical sectors), our central arguments are robust.13
Shock to trend or shock to cycle
Finally, since our model is a three-period model, until now we did not need
to take a stand about the nature of the persistent shock. Is  a shock to cycle
(ultimately mean revertible) or a shock to trend (which will therefore alter
the level of output permanently)? This question has a clear bearing on the
empirical strategy for testing of the comparative statics.
Assume, first, that the persistent shock amounts to a shock to trend. In
this case, a negative shock entails a permanent reduction in future levels of
12See, for example, Cohen (1992), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and Calvo (2000). If
circumstances following default weaken access to trade credit or cause other financial
disruptions, we may well have the case that investment and hence expected output in
period 2 depend on the repayment decision in the previous period.
13This is demonstrated in a supplementary appendix.
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trend output, so that default today will help explain a default many years
into the future. If a negative shock today triggers default, investors will
revise down their trend output predictions. As the sovereign is thus seen
to be more risky, sovereign spreads will have to rise to enable lenders to
break-even ex-ante. As debt servicing costs rise, so will the cost of future
repayments, leading to default traps.
On the other hand, if the cyclical component is broadly defined as suffi-
ciently long (as often the case for some emerging markets – see Aiolfi et al.
2006), 1 can be interpreted as a persistent but still cyclical, mean-revertible
shock. In this case, the described mechanism can still explain default traps
for two reasons. If investors seek to break even each period, a country with
higher persistence of cyclical shocks will always face a higher spread; when
the same negative shock hits all countries with the same borrowing needs
relative to output, those paying higher spreads and hence higher debt servic-
ing costs will be more prone to default. So, differences in cyclical persistence
help explain why certain countries are more prone to fall prey of default
traps. Intuitively, this is not surprising: countries more prone to long deep
recessions will tend to have a harder time in repaying. This has clear cross-
sectional testable implications which we examine below. A second reason
has to do with investors’ gradual learning about the persistence properties
of a country’s output process. In practice, investors do not know ρ but learn
it. In this case, an Argentine default in 1983, for instance, will indicate to
investors that Argentina is a high persistence country and thus will have to
face higher spreads on a permanent basis. If so, future debt servicing costs
will rise notwithstanding the fact that output eventually returns to trend.
This may lead to default traps through the same mechanism just described.
3 Empirics
In this section we test empirically test four main implications of the above
theoretical set-up.
1. Hypothesis 1: There is a positive default premium. That is, countries
with a previous default history should pay higher spreads relative to
the risk-free rate, controlling for other fundamentals. This follows from
Proposition 1.
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2. Hypothesis 2: Countries with higher underlying persistence of output
shocks face higher sovereign spreads, all else constant. This follows
from Proposition 2.
3. Hypothesis 3: The default premium rises with the persistence of output
shocks. That is, among countries with the same credit history, those
with higher underlying persistence of output shocks should face higher
spreads. This, too, follows from Proposition 2.
4. Hypothesis 4: Countries with higher conditional volatility of output
gaps (that is, those that are more prone to larger shocks) will tend to
face higher spreads. This follows directly from the lenders’ break-even
condition, as discussed in Section 2.5.
As these hypotheses have both cross-sectional and time-series implica-
tions, an important requirement for their assessment is the existence of long
data series on sovereign spreads on a broad cross-country basis, encompass-
ing a number of default events. Such a dataset will allow for more robust
inferences about the response of spreads and repayment decisions to the evo-
lution of persistence and the variance of shocks over time. With this purpose,
a major contribution of this paper is to construct a long dataset that incor-
porates pre-war data.14 Our sample starts from the early globalization years
of the 1870s through the eve of World War II, covering 33 countries for this
period. For the post-1990 period the coverage extends to 60 countries and
includes two additional variables, debt maturity and denomination, that we
use as additional controls in the later sub-sample.
Our theoretical model suggests a reasonably parsimonious empirical spec-
ification for the determinants of default risk, comprising six individual vari-
ables: an external risk-free interest rate, the ratio of debt to GDP, the ratio
of exports to GDP as an indicator of openness to capture the costs of default
14In the post-war period, a consistent series on emerging market sovereign bond indices
(EMBIs) is only available from 1994 onwards and, even then, suffers from a sample selection
bias in the first few years. This is because the countries issuing internationally traded
bonds (Bradies) were the ones with tarnished recent history of sovereign default. It was
not until later in the 1990s that a more diversified group of emerging markets countries
began issuing widely-traded bonds in international capital markets. Unlike its pre-war
counterpart used in this paper, this post-1990 series does not encompass the whole gamut
of developing and developed countries. We discuss the econometric implications of this
sample composition below.
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(in terms of trade losses and compromised access to trade-related external
financing), measures of volatility and persistence of output shocks, and a
credit history indicator so as to account for time-varying shifts in default
premia. Further, because the default premium interacts with persistence
(Hypothesis 2) and potentially also with volatility (as discussed in Section
2.5), the respective interactive terms are included in the regressions.
The two distinct interpretations of our theoretical set up discussed in
Section 2.6 call for distinct estimation approaches for the volatility and per-
sistence parameters. Suppose that the trend is deterministic or nearly deter-
ministic but the cyclical component displays considerable persistence. In this
case, a standard widely-used measure of stochastic persistence is the slope
coefficient of a regression of detrended real GDP – the so-called output gap,
as obtained by say the standard HP-filter method – on its first-order lag.15
In this case, stochastic volatility can be gauged by the standard deviations of
the respective regression residuals. To allow for gradually evolving changes
in volatility and persistence, we compute both measures recursively over a
10-year or 20-year rolling window, consistent with what is typically done in
the business cycle literature (see Mendoza, 1995; Williamson et al., 2006;
Aiolfi et al., 2006).16
Alternatively, if we interpret 1 as a trend shock, the natural approach
is the trend-cycle decomposition proposed by Beveridge and Nelson (1981).
It consists of modeling output as an ARIMA (p, 1, q), where p and q can
be chosen by usual likelihood-based criteria. In this case, we can define the
trend gap as:
4zt − µ = [(1 + θ1 + θ2 + ...+ θq)/(1− ϕ1 − ϕ2...− ϕp)] · t,
where 4z stands for trend output growth (measured as the first difference
of the log of output), µ represents its deterministic component (drift), t
is i.i.d. and N(0, σ2). Persistence is measured as ρ = [(1 + θ1 + θ2 + ... +
θq)/(1−ϕ1−ϕ2...−ϕp)], with θ’s and ϕ’s being the respective moving average
15As standard, we set the HP-filter smoothing factor to 100 with annual data. This
yields considerable smoothness in trend growth in the long annual series for the countries
in our sample.
16To avoid throwing away information on pre-1890s defaults in our sample, we use a 10-
year rolling volatility window in the pre-WWI sub-sample and then a 20-year window in
the interwar and post-WWII sub-samples. Similar rolling window measures are employed
when we construct instrumental variables for real GDP as discussed below.
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(MA) and autoregressive (AR) parameters of the underlying ARIMA (p, 1, q)
regression of the country’s real GDP on a constant plus any significant MA(q)
and AR(p) terms. The residual of the respective ARIMA regressions are the
measure of the output shocks. Clearly, if ρ = 0, then the trend is purely
deterministic (expanding at a constant rate µ), and the trend gap vanishes.
In this case, default relays no information on the future output path, so the
postulated mechanism in the model is no longer operative. The theoretically
interesting and more realistic case is thus that where ρ 6= 0. Note that since
in the Beveridge-Nelson (henceforth, ‘BN’) decomposition  is both a shock
to trend and a shock to the purely transient component of output, there is
just one single source of shock in this context.17
Starting with the HP-filter measure of cyclical persistence, Table 3 spans
the pre-WWI era reporting the pooled OLS regressions of the country spread
as the left-hand side variable. The country spread is defined as the (average)
interest rate on the respective sovereign bonds relative to the benchmark
foreign interest rate of similar maturity (the UK consol for the pre-WII period
and the US long bond rate later – see Appendix 2). The reported z-statistics
are corrected for heterocedasticity (using the standard White estimator) and
for country-specific first-order auto-correlation. Debt to GDP, exports to
GDP, volatility, and persistence enter the regression with a one-year lag so
as to mitigate endogeneity biases.18 As in Obstfeld and Taylor (2003), we
drop from all regressions observations corresponding to spreads above 1,000
basis points so as to eliminate non-traded bonds and bonds of countries in
default.
[Table 3 about here]
Column (1) in Table 3 reports our baseline specification without a de-
fault premium term. This specification could be interpreted as testing the
17As can be seen from the above equation, how much the shock  is attributed to the
trend vs. to the transient component in the BN decomposition depends on the persis-
tence parameter ρ. In terms of our model, this amounts to assuming that there is just
one shock but investors make inferences about ρ. Working, as we did, with two shocks
and a common knowledge assumption about ρ facilitates the theoretical exposition and
comparative statics. These approach are equivalent empirical strategies based on the BN
decomposition.
18The external interest rate could be thought of as exogenous for all but two countries
in our sample – the US and the UK. However a specifications with rf lagged one year
dominates the specification with contemporaneous rf .
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symmetric information benchmark version of our model (where the default
premium is zero), as well as variants found in other studies discussed above.
As typical in country spread regressions, the R-square is relatively low reflect-
ing the fact that spreads are known to be sensitive to news and uncorrelated
shocks. Yet, all the estimated coefficients yield signs that are consistent with
those of the theoretical model and are statistically significant at 5 percent,
including the debt-to-GDP variable which was not found to be significant by
Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) in their pre-WWI regressions.19 The respective
point estimates show that a one percentage point increase in the conditional
volatility implies a 15 basis point increase in sovereign spreads, while a 10
percentage point increase in persistence raises spreads by 4 basis points, all
else constant. These effects may appear small by the standards of the 1980s
or 1990s, but not so in the pre-WWI context when the average spread was
about 200 basis points and the cross-country dispersion of spreads was much
tighter.20
In light of the potential endogeneity problems, column (2) of Table 3
replaces the output gap-based indicators with an instrument. In order to
ensure strict exogeneity, and thus stack the deck against the postulated hy-
potheses, we do not follow the usual approach of including weakly exogenous
variables in the regressions creating these instruments; instead, we construct
the country-specific instrument for the output gap indicator by regressing
the latter of the respective country’s terms of trade, the world interest rate,
and an indicator of world output growth.21 To the extent that these three
variables are strictly exogenous to individual country spreads, any remain-
ing endogeneity bias is eliminated. The results of this instrumental variable
regression clearly indicate the previous results were robust: all coefficients
19The discrepancy may be due to a variety of reasons. Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) do
not control for the volatility and persistence effects considered here; our sample has wider
country coverage and for four Latin American countries uses GDP indicators that are
deemed to be more reliable than the Maddison data used in their study. See Appendix 2
for details.
20Furthermore, cross-country spread dispersion declined dramatically during the period
as capital markets became more internationally integrated. By the eve of WWI, the cross-
country standard deviation of spreads was down to 91 basis points. See Flandreau and
Zumer (2004), for a discussion of these trends.
21These estimate of world output growth was constructed as a weighted average of real
GDP in eight countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, UK and the US) in
1990 dollars, as provided in Maddison (2003). In these instrumental regression we allowed
for up to one lag of each independent variable.
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retain a very similar order of magnitude of the regressions in column and are
statistically significant at 1%.
Column (3) of Table 3 introduces a default history variable. This country-
specific credit history indicator gauges how much of the default premium
percolates into the country spread. In other words, we now test the extent to
which the borrower’s action (default vs. repay) helps explain the evolution
of spreads over and above the information contained in other fundamentals.
Our indicator of default history is defined as the number of years in default
since the beginning of the sample, so as to captures this time-dependence. As
such, this boost to the spread from the default premium decays over time with
successive repayments and bounces back up every time a new default occurs,
as entailed by the model.22 As per Hypothesis 1, we expect this variable to be
positively correlated with current spreads and statistically significant. Table
3 shows that this is the case. Its point estimate indicates that a country with
a default history at the sample mean (0.08) has its spread boosted by over
40 basis points relative to a country that has never defaulted. Once again,
since spreads for the 1870-1913 period averaged some 200 basis points, the
effect was substantial. In particular, for those countries in the sample which
spent up 30 percent of the time incurring arrears on foreign debt, the default
premium could exceed 150 basis points.
Results reported in column (4) of Table 3 gauge the direction and extent
to which the persistence and volatility of output interact with the default
premium. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, conditional upon default, countries
with higher persistence tend to have a higher default premium, boosting the
respective country spread by another 25 basis points at mean (0.08*0.032)
times the persistence parameter (0.5 on average). In contrast, the negative
sign on the interactive volatility variable (default history*volatility) indicates
that higher conditional output volatility tends to dampen the default pre-
mium. This is consistent with the notion discussed in Section 2.5 that greater
dispersion of output shocks tends to reduce the information content of de-
fault/repayment actions and hence the default premium. It is also consistent
with the idea that higher underlying output volatility makes default more
excusable in the sense of Grossman and Van Huyck (1988); so spreads do not
rise as much following a default announcement relative to baseline. In other
words, even though the net effect of volatility on country spreads remain pos-
22A similarly constructed indicator is used in Reinhart et al. (2003).
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itive,23 the asymmetric information mechanism working through the default
premium measure appears to be dampening this effect somewhat.
Columns (5) to (9) of Table 3 subject these findings to variety of con-
trols. We start with fixed effects associated with differences between devel-
oped countries and less developed ones by introducing a “periphery” dummy,
which takes a value one for countries in the periphery and zero otherwise (as
in Obtsfeld and Taylor, 2003). The aim is to capture a host of structural
characteristics not amenable to easy measurement, such as quality of insti-
tutions and degrees of financial development. To the extent that quality of
institutions and financial maturity are also proxies for the degree of informa-
tion asymmetries, we should expect this catch-all variable to be significantly
related to spreads and possibly weaken somewhat the coefficient on the de-
fault history indicator. Our empirical results conforms with the theoretical
priors.
We also introduce, as Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) did, an “empire” dummy
that indicates if a country was part of the British empire – a catch-all proxy
for assurances of greater investors’ legal protection and arguably better ac-
cess to relevant country-specific information. In the context of our model,
this dummy can be viewed as both capturing a a potential increase in the
recovery rate parameter c, which will tend to lower spreads, and also a proxy
for lower information asymmetries. As expected, this dummy takes on the
expected negative sign, is highly significant statistically, and its inclusion in
the regression lowers somewhat the coefficient on the default history variable.
Exchange rate regimes are often perceived to be related to country risk,
so it seems important to examine whether our hypotheses stand up to such
a control variable. In the pre-WWII era, the main dichotomy is that be-
tween countries that were on the gold standard and those that were not, so
“Gold” dummy (taking on the unit value for those on the gold standard)
was introduced. The results reported in column (5) are consistent with the
findings of Bordo and Rockoff (1996) as well as Obstfeld and Taylor (2003):
membership of the gold standard shaved off some 70 basis points in country
spreads, consistent with the view of gold standard membership as a ‘good
housekeeping seal of approval’. Its main effect in the regression is to lower
23This can be seen by multiplying the point estimate of 0.895 by the mean of the
default history variable (0.08) which yields 0.072 which is smaller than the coefficient of
the volatility term alone (0.122).
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the significance of the openness variable, without substantially affecting the
size and statistical significance of the model’s variables of interest.
The remaining controls in the regressions are the ratio of foreign currency-
denominated external debt to total debt (a proxy for ’original sin’, as in
IADB, 2006), and terms of trade shock: if large enough, the latter may
prompt a country into default along the lines of capacity to pay arguments.
Neither of these variables are statistically significant. Nor do their inclusion
impact on the proximate magnitude and statistical significance of volatility,
persistence, and default premium terms. Overall, the results for the pre-WWI
period are very consistent with the model’s theoretical priors and provide
significant support for the hypotheses laid out above.
Table 4 turns to the interwar period. We follow Obstfeld and Taylor
(2003) in focusing on the post-1924 years, thereby dropping from the sam-
ple the early post-WWI spell – when war dislocations, hyperinflations, and
Britain’s delay in re-joining gold had far-reaching effects on international
bond issuance. As a result while the country coverage rises to 25 due to
greater availability of output data, the number of observations is nearly half
of the pre-WWI sample in Table 3. We follow the same empirical strategy as
in Table 3, starting with the symmetric information baseline model, before
adding the other variables and controls.
Column (1) in Table 4 indicates that the fit of the baseline model is
much poorer than its pre-WWI counterpart. Neither the international risk
free rate nor the debt to GDP ratio are statistically significant any longer
at conventional levels though both retain their expected theoretical signs.
As will be seen below, both features of this baseline regression will change
drastically as we bring this stripped-down specification closer to our model.
Even without doing so, the volatility and persistence indicators remain both
significant at 5% and effect of persistence on spreads is now much larger: a
10 percentage point increase in persistence leads to 14 basis point increase in
spreads (as opposed to 4 bps in the pre-WWI sample). Instrumenting both
variables out as in column (2) halves the respective coefficients, but both
variables remain significant at close to 5%.24
24This is partly related to the fact that, as most economies in our sample became closer
through international trade and financial linkages, our set of instruments (terms of trade,
the world interest rate, and world GDP growth) bore a much weaker correlation with GDP
in each country from the 1930s world depression onwards. Yet, once again, we preferred
24
[Table 4 about here]
Column (3) in Table 4 shows that introducing default history has a major
impact on the regression fit and also on the statistical significance of the
debt to GDP ratio. This may not appear surprising since there were many
defaults during this short period. However, the results signals the presence of
a positive and large default premium; the existence of which has previously
been disputed in the literature on the inter-War period (Eichengreen and
Portes, 1989; Jorgensen and Sachs, 1989). Introducing the interactive term
between the default history and persistence also brings out results that clearly
support Hypotheses 1 and 3, and consistent with those of the pre-WWI
sample.
These results remain basically the same after the introduction of a periph-
ery dummy in column (5). However, once the empire dummy is introduced
(column 6), its main effect is to bring down the significance of the default
history variable. For the reasons discussed in connection with the pre-WWI
regressions, this loss in the significance is not surprising: the empire dummy is
also proxying for the existence of asymmetric information between borrowers
and lenders and, if anything, differences in credit information and enforce-
ment between empire and non-empire countries appear to have become par-
ticularly stark in the inter-war era (Eichengreen and Portes, 1989). Further,
this tighter multicollinearity effect between the empire dummy and default
history should be expected once we take into account the short time span
of the inter-war period. The fact that the overall fit of the regression does
not change much after the introduction of the empire dummy corroborates
this point. No less importantly, however, the coefficient on the stand-alone
default history variable still retains the expected positive sign: its size and
effect become stronger when interacted with the persistence indicator (the
respective coefficient rising from 0.18 to 0.21). In short, once other controls
related to the role of asymmetry of information are introduced in the regres-
sion model, the main significant effect of default history on country spreads
takes place via its interaction with the persistence parameter. Columns (7)
and (8) corroborates these results, showing that they are robust to the in-
clusion of a gold standard dummy and terms of trade shocks. Column (9)
to stick to the strictly exogenous instruments as in Table 3 (rather than using weakly
exogenous instruments including the export to GDP ratio) so as to stack the deck against
our inferences.
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drops the empire dummy while leaving in other controls, thus driving home
the point about the collinearity effects between the default history history
and the empire dummy over the inter-war sample.
Table 5 reports the results for the 1994-2004 period. Despite the wider
coverage in terms of number of countries, the number of observations in
these regressions is considerably lower than the pre-WWII regressions due
to the lack of bond spread data for many emerging markets before the late
1990s/early 2000s. The cross-sectional dimension of these regressions far
dominates the time-series dimension. Partly reflecting this, the fit is much
higher for the baseline regressions relative to the pre-War samples where the
baseline model accounting for about half of variations in country spreads.
Once again, the persistence and volatility variables are statistically signifi-
cant as shown in column (1), so are the other two relevant model-dictated
variables - the risk-free US interest rate and the debt-to-GDP ratio. Also
consistent with our model, there is evidence of a positive and significant de-
fault premium, as shown in column (3). This is so even though the 1994-2004
sample is severely biased toward countries that have defaulted serially in the
past (mostly issuers of Brady bonds), excluding all advanced countries that
were previously present in the two pre-WWII samples. Regression results
reflect these two sample limitations – the very limited time-series dimen-
sion and the bias towards countries that with higher output volatility and
persistence that have default serially in the past. This can be seen from re-
sults in column (4), which indicate substantial multicollinearity between the
stand-alone default history variable and its interactive terms with conditional
output volatility and persistence. Once the three variables are included in
the regression, two of them are statistically insignificant and one of them (de-
fault history*persistence) yields the opposite sign. Looking at the underlying
raw data, the reason is clear: the correlation coefficients between default his-
tory and the two interactive terms are 0.89 and 0.92 respectively. In other
words, given the post-1993 sample limitations, not much new information
can be drawn from such interactive terms once default history, persistence
and volatility are already present in the regression. On this basis, we proceed
by keeping the default history variable in the regression alone and gradually
introduce new controls.
[Table 5 about here]
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The first control pertains to the inclusion of regional dummies rather
than a periphery dummy (given that these regressions encompass a more
homogenous group of emerging markets), of which only the dummy for Asia
is significant (column 4 of Table 5).25 In contrast with the pre-WWII re-
gressions, column 5 shows that the exchange rate regime does not matter
for emerging market countries. Greater data availability for the post-1993
sample now allows us also to test the effects of debt maturity, terms of trade
shocks, and international reserve coverage (as a share of broad money, M2),
variables often deemed to be important in explaining financial and currency
crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998). Results reported in columns (6) to (8)
show that none of them adds to the model’s explanatory power on country
risk. Finally, columns (9) and (10) drop the default history variable and enter
only the respective interactive terms on volatility and persistence. In con-
trast with pre-WWII results, the default history*volatility term now yields
a positive sign. In contrast, persistence-default history interactive variable
yields the model’s predicted sign and is statistically significant at 1%. Over-
all, and taking into account the post-1993 sample limitations, we take the
results as broadly consistent with the theoretical model and with Hypotheses
1 to 3.
We conclude this section by presenting a similar set of regressions using
the Beveridge-Nelson (BN) measure of the “trend gap”. Since the ARIMA
estimation is more data intensive and one needs longer data series to evalaute
trend volatility and better distinguish between shocks to trend vs. shocks
to cycle, we report such results only for the inter-war and the post-1993
samples.26 Starting with the interwar results in Table 6, two main differences
with the HP filter-measures of the output gap is that the coefficient on the
stand-alone persistence is of an order of magnitude lower and that of volatility
considerably higher. Since both sets of regressions span essentially the same
observations, the difference seemingly lies on the BN filter’s attribution of
25This is likely because of Asian crisis governments in the late 1990s did not formally
go into default with the exception of Indonesia’s debt renegotiation but the havoc in these
countries clearly weighed down on spreads.
26Results for the pre-WWI containing less than two-thirds of the observations featuring
in Table 3 (which uses the HP-gap) are available from the authors upon request. Even
though the data requirements for ARIMA estimation leads us to drop several pre-1900
default events, both the default history and the default history*persistence interactive
terms yield the right sign, are statistically significant at 5%, and robust to all controls
featuring in Table 3.
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output shocks to trend shocks, raising the persistence measure and hence
lowering its estimated coefficient, all else constant. This result carries over
to the default history-persistence interactive variable. Aside from this main
difference, the results are closely in line with those of Table 4 using the HP-
gap. This includes some of the dilution of the stand-alone default history
variable when the empire dummy is introduced in the regressions, and the
strong significance of default history when interacted with the persistence
parameter. As in the HP-filter regressions of Table 4, the model’s other
main predictions are robust to a variety of controls. Likewise, post-1993
results, presented in Table 7 are very similar with their HP-gap counterparts
in Table 5.
[Table 6 and 7 about here]
Overall, we conclude from this section that the default trap pricing mech-
anism postulated in our model is broadly consistent with long-run data on
sovereign bond pricing and macroeconomic determinants. In particular, the
roles of credit history and output persistence are generally highly significant
and robust to a host of controls, including break-downs by period. Last
but not least, our main empirical results are likewise robust to two classic
de-trending methods, and not an artifact of HP-filter detrending.
4 Conclusion
History tells us that sovereign creditworthiness displays persistence: coun-
tries that default once are more likely to do so again, and face higher spreads
as a result. This paper has sought to rationalize this stylized fact through
the idea of a default premium. A sovereign’s decision to default signals that
it was likely hit by a large negative output shock which may persist, thus
raising future debt-to-output ratios above the expected baseline. As compet-
itive lenders seek to break even and the sovereign continues to tap the market
given its financing needs, this gives rise to a positive default premium. By
increasing country spreads, and hence the borrower’s debt burden relative
to output, this mechanism makes future default more likely, thus creating
default traps.
Three ingredients are key to make this mechanism operative. First, the
existence of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders on the
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nature of output shocks – without it, the default premium is zero and spreads
do not react to repayment decisions beyond publicly known information
about fundamentals. Second, shocks to the gap between actual and ex-
pected output (the “output gap”) must be reasonably persistent – without
persistence default decisions have no informational content on the evolution
of debt burden relative to output. Third, output must be sufficiently volatile,
so that countries may face output realizations that are low enough to make
default optimal.
While previous studies have examined the impact of output volatility and
persistence on country spreads and default risk, none of them has, to the best
of our knowledge, linked these ingredients together. As a result, while previ-
ous theoretical models show that high conditional volatility and persistence
of output shocks alone can explain serial default, they cannot account for
why two countries with the same fundamentals (including underlying volatil-
ity and persistence of output shocks) may face distinct spreads. In this paper,
we show that this may happen if they suffer different output realizations at
a given point in time that lead one – struck by an adverse shock – to default
and the other to repay. Under asymmetric information, the defaulting coun-
try will face higher spreads and hence a heavier debt burden in the future,
so it is more likely to default again all else constant. As such, our model
delivers path dependence in credit history in a way not discussed in previous
work. Further, since default in our model reveals new forward-looking in-
formation about debt burdens that supplements publicly-known information
about fundamentals, our theoretical mechanism also explains the well-known
fact that spreads shoot up following default announcements.
The other main contribution of this paper is empirical. Empirical testing
of previous theoretical models of default risk has employed more limited data
sets than ours. To test the postulated theoretical mechanism, this paper de-
velops a comprehensive cross-country dataset spanning over a century. This
is important because default history and the causal mechanisms postulated in
our model display significant cross-country differences (due to institutions,
commodity specialization, etc.) which are typically structural and hence
slowly-evolving; so it is key that a thorough test of the theory be based on a
broad cross-country sample with a reasonably long time series dimension.
Three findings consistently stand out across the main sub-periods (pre-
World War I, inter-War, and post-1990 years). First, countries that face
higher spreads are typically the ones displaying higher conditional volatil-
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ity and persistence of output gaps. Second, countries face a substantially
positive and statistically significant default premium. Third, such a default
premium is rising in the underlying persistence of output shocks. These re-
sults are robust to a host of controls featuring in previous studies. They are
also very robust to measures of output volatility and persistence based on
distinct detrending methods. We interpret this empirical findings as strong
evidence that the default trap mechanism postulated in our model is consis-
tent with long-run data on sovereign bond pricing and the macroeconomic
determinants. As such, our model provides an additional and complementary
mechanism to those postulated in earlier work on the pervasiveness of serial
default and “debt intolerance” (Reinhart et al., 2003). On the empirical side,
our historical evidence also highlights the important role of historical output
volatility and persistence indicators in country spread regressions, particu-
larly for pre-WWII period where the inclusion of these variables has been
regrettably absent in previous work.
Some practical implications follow. Plainly, the above results highlight
the importance of reforming institutions and changing policy frameworks
that typically make many emerging markets slower in recovering from large
negative shocks. The above results also suggest that countries with higher
underlying dispersion of temporary shocks are more vulnerable to sheer “bad
luck” in output realizations. Given that such bad luck can give rise to default
traps, two other implications follow. The most obvious is to place special
emphasis on the need to mitigated volatile policies and financial structures
that exacerbate output volatility in emerging markets. The other is that it
may pay off to go an extra mile to ensure debt repayment during bad times
- this effort being the more worthwhile the greater the existing asymmetry
information about country-specific fundamentals. That said, and insofar
as some asymmetry remains and bad luck in output realizations continue
play a role, it may also take more than improvements in fundamentals to
escape from a default trap: once investors are imperfectly informed about
how persistent is the shock and the sovereign’s borrowing needs remain high,
good luck in output realizations may turn out to be just as important. If
so, a worthwhile issue for future empirical research is to establish how some
countries have managed to get out from default traps in practice.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof establishes that the strategies are optimal given beliefs and other
player’s strategy and beliefs are consistent with observed choices. Step 1
begins by assuming the the optimality of the borrower’s repayment choice
in period 1, and establishes the optimality of subsequent choices. Step 2
confirms the optimality of period-1 repayment decision rule.
Step 1. Assume that the borrower’s decision rule at t = 1 is to repay if and
only if 1 exceeds some arbitrary threshold e1, that is, if 1 ≥ e1. At t = 2,
contingent on history h, with repayment obligation Dh2 , the borrowers’s net
payoff to repayment is Y˜2 −Dh2 , while sanctions and partial recovery of debt
following default leave it with (1−s)Y˜2−cDh2 . Clearly, in period 2 repayment
is rational if and only if Y˜2 ≥ [(1− c)/s]Dh2 ≡ Y ∗2h.
If the lender believes, as assumed above, that the borrower repays iff
1 ≥ e1, it updates its prior beliefs Φ(1) as follows. Default signals that the
persistent shock was drawn from the lower tail of the distribution, truncated
at e1 so that the posterior density function is given by
γd(1|e1) =
{
φ(1)
Φ(e1)
for 1 < e1
0 for 1 ≥ e1
If instead, lenders observe repayment
γr(1|e1) =
{
0 for 1 < e1
φ(1)
1−Φ(e1) for 1 ≥ e1
Let Γh(1|e1) denote the associated cumulative distribution functions. Ob-
serve that Γd(1|e1) = Φ(1)/Φ(e1) is decreasing in e1, while Γr(1|e1) =
Φ(1)/(1 − Φ(e1)) is increasing in e1. This difference will matter for our
results.
The lender’s strategy at t = 0 is to set a price that allows it to break
even given the probability of default Φ(e1). Its strategy at t = 1 de-
pends on the expected default probabilities, which in turn depend on beliefs
about future output consistent with posterior distributions over the persis-
tent shock. Given distributions Gh(Y˜2|e1) (over period-2 output) consistent
with the above posteriors and given the borrowers period-2 default rule, we
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have pih2(e1) = Gh((
1−c
s
)Dh2 |e1). Substituting in equation (3), which specifies
the investment requirement in period 1, the bond issue Dh2 must satisfy
[1− (1− c)pih2(Dh2 )]Dh2 = RfI1. (12)
Some useful properties follow directly from the Bayesian updating rule.
Lemma 1 The default premium is positive.
To see why note that, given persistence, Gr(·), the distribution of period-2
output conditional on repayment, dominates Gd(·) in the first-order stochas-
tic sense.27 This implies pir2(D2) < pi
d
2(D2) for any given D2. From (12) it
follows that Dd2 > D
r
2. As default probabilities are increasing in the amount
borrowed, we must have pir2(D
r
2) < pi
d
2(D
d
2). Finally, using equations (5) and
(6), it follows that bond prices are lower contingent on default (pd1 < p
r
1), or
equivalently the default premium id − ir is positive.
Lemma 2 Dd2 is decreasing in e1 while D
r
2 is increasing in e1.
Note that Dh2 depends on e1 as this conditions Γh and, through that, Gh.
Observe that Γd(·|e′1) ≤ Γd(·|e1) for e′1 > e1 and so also Gd(·|e′1) ≤ Gd(·|e1).
This implies pid2 is decreasing in e1 and consequently D
d
2 is decreasing too.
In contrast, for e′1 > e1 the distribution Γr(·|e′1) ≥ Γr(·|e1), and so also
Gr(·|e′1) ≥ Gr(·|e1): this implies that pir2 and Dr2 are increasing in e1.
Step 2. We now establish the existence of an e∗1 consistent with Step 1, and the
optimality of the borrower’s repayment decision rule in period 1. Consider
any arbitrary threshold e1 such that the borrower defaults in period 1 if
1 < e1. The continuation payoff following action h for realization 1 is
V h2 (1, e1) =
∫
max[Y˜2 −Dh2 , (1− s)Y˜2 − cDh2 ]dF|1(Y˜2). (13)
Note that V h2 depends on 1 (as borrowers condition the distribution
F|1(Y˜2)) of future income on the known realization of the persistent shock)
and on the threshold for default e1 (as this affects D
h
2 ). When choosing h
in period 1, the borrower takes into account the immediate payoff and the
discounted value of the continuation payoff, V h2 . Thus repayment has payoff
V r1 (1, e1) = (Y˜1 −D1) + βV r2 (1, e1), (14)
27A distribution A(x) is said to dominate distribution B(x) in the first-order stochastic
sense if A(x) < B(x) for all x.
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while default has payoff
V d1 (1, e1) = (Y˜1 − cD1) + βV d2 (1, e1). (15)
Define g(1, e1) = V
r
1 − V d1 = β[V r2 (1, e1) − V d2 (1, e1)] − (1 − c)D1(e1).
Note that β[V r2 (1, e1) − V d2 (1, e1)] represents the gains from repayment in
terms of future financial savings (given a positive default premium). On the
other hand (1−c)D1(e1) represents the gains from default in terms of current
savings. To prove the optimality of the borrower’s strategy we show that (i)
g(1, e1) is increasing in its first argument, 1; (ii) there exists an e
∗
1 such that
g(e∗1, e
∗
1) = 0. Together these imply that g(1, e
∗
1) ≥ 0 for 1 ≥ e∗1, so that
β[V r2 (1, e1) − V d2 (1, e1) ≥ (1 − c)D1(e1). That is, it is rational to repay iff
1 ≥ e∗1.
(i) As (1 − c)D1(e1) does not vary with 1, it is sufficient to show that
β[V r2 (1, e1) − V d2 (1, e1)] is increasing in 1. Consider the following
partition of the support of Y˜2, conditional on 1. Define EL = {Y˜2 :
Y˜2 < Y
∗
2r} as the set of realizations of future output for which the
borrower will default in period 2 regardless of previous history; for
EH = {Y˜2 : Y˜2 ≥ Y ∗2d}, the borrower repays regardless of default history,
and EM = {Y˜2 : Y ∗2r ≤ Y˜2 < Y ∗2d}, the realization in which prior
repayment induces future repayment and prior default induces future
default. Evaluating β[V r2 − V d2 ] in each element of this partition, we
obtain
β
∫
EL
c[Dd2 −Dr2]dF +
∫
EM
[sY˜2 + cD
d
2 −Dr2]dF +
∫
EH
[Dd2 −Dr2]dF

F|1(·) is increasing in 1. Further, each of the integrands in the above
expression is positive and increasing. Since the default premium is
positive with fixed borrowing needs we have that Dd2−Dr2 > 0. Finally,
notice that Y˜2 − Dr2 > (1 − s)Y˜2 − cDr2 > (1 − s)Y˜2 − cDd2, hence the
integrand in the middle region is also positive. This proves that g(1, e1)
in increasing in 1.
(ii) We prove the existence of an e∗1 such that g(e
∗
1, e
∗
1) = 0 in three steps.
(ii.a) The immediate gain from default, (1− c)D1(e1), is increasing in e1. It
is bounded below by (1− c)RfI0 (when the probability of default tends
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to zero) and from above by ((1 − c)/c)RfI0 (when default is almost
sure event). This follows from equation (8).
(ii.b) The future gain from repayment, β[V r2 (1, e1) − V d2 (1, e1)] is decreas-
ing in e1. First, observe that, from by definition (13), V
h
2 (1, e1) is
decreasing in Dh2 . Next, by Lemma 2, D
d
2 is decreasing in e1 while D
r
2
is increasing in e1. Combining these two, we have V
r
2 decreasing in e1
and V d2 increasing in e1, so β[V
r
2 − V d2 ] is decreasing in e1.
(ii.c) Since the functions (1− c)D1(e1) and β[V r2 (1, e1)−V d2 (1, e1)] are con-
tinuous, a value e∗1 exists provided only that that β is not too low
relative to other parameters.28
Proof of Proposition 2
For any given e1 an increase in ρ increases the informational value of default.
To see why note that the lender’s distributionGd(Y˜
d
2 ; ρ), written as a function
of ρ satisfies the following property: Gd(Y˜
d
2 ; ρ) ≥ Gd(Y˜ d2 ; ρ′) for ρ > ρ′. In
words, observed default in period 1 leads to greater pessimism about future
returns to bondholders for ρ′ > ρ. This implies a higher pid2, so required D
d
2
is increasing in ρ. On the other hand, Gr(Y˜
r
2 ; ρ) ≤ Gr(Y˜ r2 ; ρ′) for ρ > ρ′, so
that pir2 and D
r
2 are decreasing in ρ: Observed repayment suggests a more
optimistic outlook for future repayments. Thus, for given e1, a higher value
of ρ is associated with a higher β[V r2 (1, e1)− V d2 (1, e1)]. Finally, remember
that by definition (13) V h2 (1, e1) is decreasing in D
h
2 , and that from equation
(3), Dh2 is decreasing in p
h
1 . All these facts together imply that an increase
in ρ generates an increase in the default premium as stated.
From the above argument an increase in ρ implies that at the equilibrium
e∗1 the gain from repayment exceeds the gain from default. Given that the
gain from default, (1− c)D1(e1), is increasing in e1, in order to restore equi-
librium, the equilibrium threshold e∗1 must rise. The probability of default
in period 1, given by Φ(e∗1) rises as well. By the break-even condition, this
implies that sovereign spreads in period 0 must rise.
28For an ‘interior’ solution to exist, informational content from default should be suf-
ficiently valuable – this is the case when future investment needs I1 are large relative to
I0. Our simulations, not reported here, suggest that equilbria can be found for a plausible
range of parameters.
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Appendix 2: Data and Sources
Pre-World War II data
Our pre-WWII sample spans 32 countries: Australia, India, Japan, and New
Zealand in Asia; Egypt in Africa; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru,
Venezuela, Uruguay in Latin America; Canada and the US in North Amer-
ica; Austria (including the Austro-Hungarian Empire before 1914), Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary (after WWI), Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, United King-
dom, and Turkey.
Sovereign Bond Yields and Spreads. Bond yields on long-maturity ster-
ling denominated bonds were taken from Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) for all
countries except for Peru, Venezuela, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Pre-WWI
data for Peru and Venezuela are from Kelly, Trish “Ability and Willingness
to Pay in the Age of Pax Britannica, 1890-1914,” Explorations in Economic
History, 1998, 35, 31-58, and were kindly provided by the author. Inter-
war data for all four countries were compiled from the League of Nations,
Statistical Yearbook, Geneva, several issues. Country spreads calculated as
the difference between the respective country’s bond yields and the yield on
UK consols, the latter taken from Holmer, Sidney and Richard Sillas, 1996,
A History of Interest Rates, Rutgers. From the latter source also comes
our two measures of the short-term world interest rate, i∗, used in the re-
gressions (The UK discount rate on short-term commercial paper) which we
deflated by the UK wholesale price index provided in Mitchell, Brian, 2005,
International Historical Statistics: Europe, London.
GDP. Real GDP data are from Maddison, Angus, The World Economy:
Historical Statistics, Paris, 2003 except in the following cases:
• Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico: from Aiolfi, Cata˜o, and Timmer-
mann (2006), who present a variety of robustness tests to show that
their estimates are superior to those provided by Maddison.
• Greece: new estimates provided by George Kostelenos, based on his ear-
lier research (Money and Output in Modern Greece, 1858-1938, Athens,
1995).
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• Russia: the net national product estimate from Paul Gregory, Russian
National Income, 1885-1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983), Table 3.1, 56-7, (“variant 1”).
• Spain: Prados de la Escosura, Leandro 2003, El Progreso Economico
de Espan˜a, 1850-2000 (Madrid: Fundacin BBVA), Table A. 9.1 and
A.13.5, pp. 517-22 and 681-82.
• Venezuela: Baptista, Asdru´bal, 1997, Bases Cuantitativas de la Econo-
mia Venezolana, 1830-1995, Caracas.
Nominal GDP from Obsfeld and Taylor (2003) except for the above countries
(sources as above), New Zealand (from Rankin, Keith, 1992, New Zealand’s
Gross National Product, Review of Income and Wealth, 38(1), 49-6), and for
Hungary and Yugoslavia (from Mitchell, Brian, 2003, International Historical
Statistics: Europe, New York).
Public Debt
• Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico: from Aiolfi et al. (2006).
• Peru and Venezuela: Kelly (1998) and League of Nations, op. cit.,
several issues.
• Greece: Lazaretou, Sophia, 1993, “Monetary and Fiscal Policies in
Greece: 1833-1914”, Journal of European Economic History, 22, 2.
• Venezuela: Baptista, Asdru´bal, 1997, op cit.
• All other countries from Obstfeld and Taylor (2003), Flandreau and
Zumer (2004), and the League of Nations, op. cit., several issues. The
last two sources provide a breakdown between domestic and foreign
currency debt.
Foreign Trade
• Export values from Brian Mitchell’s International Historical Statistics:
The Americas, Asia and Oceania, and Europe, London.
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• Terms of Trade from Blattman, C, J Hwang, and J Williamson, 2006,
“How do Trade and Financial Integration affect the Relationship be-
tween Growth and Volatility”, Journal of International Economics, 69,
176-202, kindly provided by the authors. Exceptionally, the series for
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico are from Aiolfi et al. (2006).
Post-World War II data
Our post-WWII includes all countries of the pre-WWII sample except for
Serbia, and adds the following 29 countries: Botswana, Gabon, Jordan, Mo-
rocco, Oman, South Africa; China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand; Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay; Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Poland, Romania; Iceland, and Switzerland.
Sovereign Bond Yields and Spreads. JPMorgan Emerging Market Bond
Index (EMBI). Our measure of the world risk-free interest rate, rf , is the 3-
month US T-Bill rate taken from IMF’s International Financial Statistics
(IFS) and deflated by the US WPI provided in the same source.
GDP. International Financial Statistics.
Public Debt and other Fiscal Data. Luis A.V. Cata˜o and Marco E.
Terrones, 2005, “Fiscal Deficits and Inflation, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 52, 529-554. Updated through 2005 using data from the IFS, IMF’s
World Economic Outlook (WEO), and the World Bank’s Global Develop-
ment database (GDD).
Foreign Trade, International Reserves, Real Exchange Rates, and
Monetary Aggregates. IFS, WEO, and GDD.
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Supplementary Appendix
Allowing for endogenous variations in investment
There are various ways to weaken the model structure that fixes investment
level (see equation (10)). It could be that default lowers the productivity of
all investment (that is, affects function f). Alternatively, countries in default
may face more stringent sanctions that cause it to lose a fraction s of the
output f(It). If so, the net return to the investment is
(1− spit+1)f(It)−RfIt, (16)
with first order condition
(1− spit+1)f ′(It)−Rf = 0. (17)
With a concave utility function, it implies that optimally-chosen investment
level is decreasing in default probability pi. For instance, if pid2 > pi
r
2, we will
have Id2 < I
r
2 . This may fit data better: empirical evidence suggests that
investment does fall in default-struck economies.
Whether our results are robust to this weakening depends on what hap-
pens to the size of the bond issue, Dh2 . Recall that if I1 is exogenously fixed,
and if as equation (3) specified, ptDt+1 = It, then pt and Dt+1 necessarily
move in opposite directions: ie. if pr1 > p
d
1 then D
r
2 < D
d
2. Put differently, if
investment I1 is inelastic, the elasticity of the required bond issue D2 with
respect to price p1 must be −1.
Our central results in the paper – Proposition 1 in particular – are pre-
served in a more general setting, at least as long as the elasticity of invest-
ment with respect to bond prices is less than 1. This restriction on elasticity
buys us the relationship Dr2 < D
d
2. In that case our existence result goes
through with only minor modifications. This note describes the necessary
modifications.
Notice that second period output will depend on the variable level of
investment. We have
Y˜ r2 = f(I
r
1) + ρ˜1 + ω˜2,
Y˜ d2 = f(I
d
1 ) + ρ˜1 + ω˜2,
with Y˜ r2 > Y˜
d
2 as I
r
1 > I
d
1 . The modification of the proof of Proposition 1 is
as follows.
1
In Step 1 of the proof, we have the following modification. At t = 2, contin-
gent on history h, repayment is rational if and only if Y˜ h2 ≥ [(1− c)/s]Dh2 ≡
Y ∗2h. Repayment is even more likely given a previous history of repayment
as output is boosted by the greater investment income. In other words, pir2
is lower than it would be with fixed investment and pid2 is higher. If previous
default has real consequences for investment and output, the implied default
premium is going to be even larger. This modification actually reinforces the
incentive to repay.
In Step 2 we had established the optimality of the repayment decision rule
in period 1. Critically, we need to show that (i) β[V r2 (1, e1) − V d2 (1, e1)] is
increasing in 1, so that repayment occurs above some threshold.
Consider, in the same spirit as before, a partition of the support of Y˜2,
conditional on 1. Define EL = {Y˜2 : Y˜2 < Y ∗2r} as the set of realizations of
future output for which the borrower will default in period 2 regardless of
previous history; for EH = {Y˜2 : Y˜2 ≥ Y ∗2d}, the borrower repays regardless
of default history, and EM = {Y˜2 : Y ∗2r ≤ Y˜2 < Y ∗2d}, the realization in which
prior repayment induces future repayment and prior default induces future
default.
Recall that when evaluating [V r2 − V d2 ] in each element of this partition
for the cased with fixed investment (i.e. when Y r2 = Y
d
2 ), we had∫
EL
c[Dd2 −Dr2]dF +
∫
EM
[sY˜2 + cD
d
2 −Dr2]dF +
∫
EH
[Dd2 −Dr2]dF

Now the corresponding terms in the three elements of the partition are
• (1− s)(Y r2 − Y d2 ) + c(Dd2 −Dr2), in EL;
• (1− s)(Y r2 − Y d2 ) + sY˜2 + cDd2 −Dr2, in EM ;
• Y r2 − Y d2 +Dd2 −Dr2, in EH .
In each case we have added a positive (and non-decreasing from EL to EH)
term to each of the integrands in the previously-discussed case. That is
sufficient for the formal results.
More generally, note that the possibility of endogenous reduction in out-
put following default (i.e., Y d2 < Y
r
2 ) reinforces the deterrence mechanism.
A sovereign borrower would be more inclined to repay to avoid the output
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losses associated with default, as well as to avoid sending out a signal that
triggers an increase in interest rates. The ‘utility cost’ of higher interest rates
may be lower if investment collapses, but would be positive nonetheless. A
theoretical model would be unable to resolve the relative costs of default
(those due to output losses vs those due to higher borrowing costs) with-
out resorting to specific functional forms. Our aim in the paper is to show
how the default premium can generate deterrence even in the absence of the
inevitable output losses.
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